Some thoughts on epistemic responsibility

I would like to personally thank the anonymous man who sat with an hysterical woman even if she herself is an idiot and ungrateful. I want to thank all the heroic men who have been there for me my entire Penelope Pittstop existence. Thank you! If I have ever seemed in the least bit ungrateful it was doubtless because I was clouded by my own mysterious and heady powers of being in the midst of my peak fertility years with no compelling female role models showing me the way. I had no idea that I wasn’t just a charming human being that men fell over themselves to assist and protect. What a fool I was. I believed all the lies.

What a nightmare it would be if women like “Themistokleia” were to replace real philosophers who aren’t necessarily ruled by the ruthless vagaries of biology.

What a nightmare it would be if there were no longer any men interested in being protective out of the misguided sense that women like “Themistokleia” are actually universal thought leaders.

Feminist Philosophers

[Trigger warning for discussion of assault]

Throughout my time as a philosopher, I’ve heard quite a bit of talk regarding ‘epistemic responsibility’ when it comes to discrimination, harassment, and assault. I’ve heard it much more frequently over the last few weeks, and so I feel compelled to say a few words about it. As it happens, I think I have a very different view of the nature of epistemic justification and the conditions under which agents can be said to have it than those who bring up epistemic responsibility in these sorts of conversations, but I want to address a slightly different question: What does moral responsibility require of us when allegations of discrimination, harassment, or assault are made? To be clear, what follows is not an endorsement of a presumption of guilt—rather, it’s an endorsement of action, sympathy, and compassion in the absence of certainty. It seems to me…

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